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A Test of Dual Labor Market Theory
ABSTRACT
Despite substantial differences in their views of the appropriate
policy response to the existence of poverty, neither the proponents of
dual market theory nor its critics have proposed potentially conclusive
tests of the dual market hypothesis.
This paper presents a test of the two central propositions of dual
market theory——i) the existence of two distinct labor markets with differ-
ent wage setting mechanisms and 2) the existence of barriers to mobility
between the labor markets. We find considerable support for both hypo-
thesis.
Estimation of a switching model of wage determination with un-
known regimes yields two distinct wage equations. The one which most
workers are associated with closely resembles the standard human capital
regression with significant returns to education and experience. The
other equation is flat with no returns to human capital. These two equa-
tions resemble the predictions of dual market theory for the "primary"
and "secondarytt markets respectively. Further, we present evidence that
(at least) some non—white workers are involuntarily confined to the
secondary market. This crowding of minority workers into the low wage
labor market accounts for a substantial portion of white/non—white wage
differences.
We interpret these results as providing empirical support for the
dual market hypothesis and for recent theoretical work on efficiency wage
models. In addition, combining the efficiency wage argument with the
observation that much of the white/non—white wage difference is explained
by the exclusion of non—whites from the primary sector suggests an ex-
planation for the persistance of wage differences.
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This paper presents a test of two of the most important claims of
dual market theory——that there is a distinct low wage (secondary) labor
market In which there are no returns to schooling and workers do not
receive on the job training, and that there are noneconomic barriers
which prevent at least some secondary workers from obtaining better
lnrimru\irihc JI
Humancapital theory has tended to emphasize differences among
people, rather than among jobs, as a determinant of the distribution of
Income. Workers in low wage jobs are viewed simply as low productivity
workers who are unwilling or unable to obtain the skills which are
necessary for access to higher paying jobs. It follows from this
approach that a solution to the poverty trap (if a solution Is necessary)
is to provide individuals with more skills or with incentives to obtain
skills.
Dual market theorists have maintained that jobs can be roughly
divided into two groups: those with low wages, bad working conditions,
unstable employment and little opportunity for advancement (secondary
jobs), and those with relatively high wages, good working conditions and
opportunities for advancement into higher paying jobs (primary jobs)
(Doeringer and Plore, 1971). Advocates of this view have argued that
primary sector jobs are rationed and that, in particular, women, blacks
and other minorities find it difficult to obtain primary employment.
Since, in the view of dual market theorists (Berger and Piore, 1980), it
is unlikely that rationing can be eliminated, training programs will not2
be successful in eliminating poverty and the majorrolesfor policy are
providing income support, ensuring that the rationing system is "fair,"
and minimizing the extent of the secondary sector by stabilizing
aggregate demand.
Despite significant differences in their views of the low wage labor
market, neither the advocates of dual market theory nor its critics have
specified potentially conclusive tests of either the dual market typology
or the hypothesis of noneconomic barriers to entering the primary
sector. Difficulties arise because tests of the dual market hypothesis
often rely on circular definitions of the sectors.
We propose strong tests of both hypotheses. Our results provide
considerable support for the view that there are two distinct labor
markets——a primary labor market with a wage profile similar to that
predicted by human capital theory and a secondary market with a
completely flat (low) wage profile. Our results also provide support for
the hypothesis that there are noneconomic barriers which prevent
nonwhites from entering the primary sector.
In the next section we review some of the most noteworthy empirical
work on dual market theory. In the third section, we outline what we
consider to be the essential differences between dual market and human
capital theory and develop a formal test which allows us to distinguish
between the two hypotheses. The results are presented in section four.
II. A Partial Review of Empirical Work on Dual Market Theory
Although advocates of dual market theory may differ on the
particulars, all agree on two basic tenets:3
1.The dual market typology described above is a useful
characterization——most jobs strongly resemble the
description of either primary or secondary jobs.
2.At most times there is rationing of primary sector
jobs.
A number of attempt￿ have been made to test either or both of these
hypotheses.
Studies of the validity of the dual market typology have taken two
forms, factor analysis of job and/or worker characteristics and
comparisons of wage equations for different occupations and industries.
All authors who have used factor analysis have found a dominant factor
fitting the dual market typology and have found bimodal distributions of
factor scores (Gordon, 1971; Buchele l976a, 1976b; Oster, 1979).
However, the correlation of certain attributes such as low wages and bad
working conditions does not provide strong support for the dual market
hypothesis of the existence of sectors with distinct wage setting
mechani Sm.
Consequently, some researchers have attempted to test more directly
the hypothesis that the wage setting mechanisms are different in the two
sectors. The approach these authors have followed is to divide
occupations and/or industries into two sectors on the basis of the
characteristics of the jobs or of workers in those occupations or
industries. Having thus divided the sample, they test for differences In
the wage equations for the two sectors. Some have found patterns
corresponding roughly to dual market theory (Osterman, 1975; Carnoy and4
Ruinberger, 1980; Buchele, 1976a, 1976b; Rosenberg, 1976; Wright, 1979);
others have found little support for the hypothesis (Zucker and
Rosenstein, 1981; Bibb and Form, 1977; Hodson, 1977). In addition, none
of these studies has been entirely free of anomalies.
Unfortunately, dividing the sample on the basis of occupation or
Industry has majordrawbacks.Since a worker's choice of industry or
occupation is not independent of unmeasured characteristics, there is
considerable danger of sample selection bias. It is not surprising to
find that in low wage sobs the return to schooling is relatively low
(Cain, 1976). In addition, the assumption that all members of an
occupation or industry are In the secondary sector may significantly
reduce the power of the test. For example, no one would argue that
managers and skilled workers in industries which employ a substantial
number of secondary workers are themselves In secondary jobs. It is
possible that the anomalous results found in this literature are due to
inaccurate classification.
Both the factor analyses and attempts to test for the existence of
distinct wage equations for the primary and secondary sectors described
above are essentially concerned only with the dual market typology. As
noted in the introduction, dual market theorists maintain not only that
they have developed an accurate typology but that primary jobs are
rationed. In fact, it is the latter position which constitutes the major
break with human capital theory.
Several authors have suggested that the existence of distinct wage
equations for the primary and secondary sectors would constitue a5
refutation of human capital theory (Buchele, 1976a, 1976b; Osterman,
1975), but this is not the case. If an individual can move out of the
secondary sector in order to obtain returns on experience or education,
the existence of a sector in which there are no returns is
inconsequential (Cain, 1976). Thus the basis of the allocation of
workers between the sectors Is crucial; are primary sector jobs rationed?
Several authors have addressed the issue of mobility between the two
sectors. Leigh (1976) finds substantial and comparable earnings growth
for black and white workers and suggests that this refutes the dual
market hypothesis. Shiller (1977) reports extensive upward mobility of
individuals at the bottom of the income distribution during the period
1957 to 1971. He argues that this constitutes a refutation of dual
market theory.
On the other hand, Rosenberg (1976) and Carnoy and Rumberger (1980)
find that minority workers are more likely to begin their careers in the
secondary sector and, having started there, are less likely to leave than
are whites. Rosenberg also finds that human capital variables do not
help to explain the upward mobility of minority workers. These authors
argue that this differential mobility supports dual market theory.
In fact, measuring mobility does not provide a test of rationing of
primary market jobs. As Rosenberg (1979) notes, some mobility is
consistent with dual market theory while purely random movement is not
implied by human capital theory. It is easy to derive a simple human
capital model with firm—specific training 'in which there is no mobility
between jobs whatsoever. No one has specified, and it is probably6
Impossible to do so correctly, what levels of mobility would constitute
refutations of dual market or human capital theory. Although studies of
differential mobility between races are suggestive, the key issue is
whether there are qualified individuals who would like to work in the
primary sector but cannot find a job there. No study has addressed this
issue.
Thus empirical work contrasting dual market and human capital theory
has suffered from two major drawbacks. The taxonomies which have been
developed simultaneously bias the results in favor of the dual market
hypothesis by virtue of the selection criteria and are too gross to allow
accurate testing of the hypothesis. Furthermore, the crucial issue of
barriers to entry has not been addressed.
In Section III we propose a technique which allows us to derive the
probability of sector attachment directly from the observed distribution
of wages and worker attributes. This resolves the problem of attributing
primary or secondary sector employment to everyone in a given industry or
occupation. We then propose a direct test for involuntary confinement of
workers to the secondary sector.
III. A Formal Test
How can we test the descriptive power of the dual markety hypothesis
without prior knowledge of the sector a person is in? Consider how we
might proceed If people's earnings potential could be suninarized by a
single observable trait---for example education and a single unobserved
trait which was uncorrelated with education. In that case we could plot7
a scatter diagram of log wages and education. The standard view of the
labor market holds that such a scatter diagram should resember figure 1.
From dual market theory we would expect a scatter diagram similar to
figure 2. A straight—forward test of the theories would therefore entail
plotting the scatter diagram and assessing whether it corresponds to
either the human capital model, or the dual market model.
Two problems complicate such an approach. First, wages are
determined by many observable characteristics other than education. To
control for all variables simultaneously, we would have to plot a scatter
diagram for each sub—group in the sample. As the number of other
variables increased, the number of observations on each diagram would
decrease considerably. With a reasonable number of controls the number
of diagrams and the sparseness of observations would certainly make it
impossible to discern any pattern.
Secondly, even if we were able to plot all the scatter diagrams, we
would still lack a formal mechanism for testing the hypotheses. Each
researcher would be free to decide for him/herself whether the diagrams
correspond more nearly to the predictions of human capital or dual market
theory. These problems can be resolved by the use of the formal methods
described in the following paragraphs.
The question of whether a plot looks more like figure 1 or 2 can be
rephrased; do two wage equations fit the data significantly better than
one, and do the best fitting equations fit the predictions of the dual
market hypothesis? We can imagine fitting first one, and then two lines
by hand to figure 2. To compare the explanatory power we might, for8
example, compute the distance from each point to the closest line. The
reduction in the sum of squares going from one line to two would be much
larger for figure two than for figure one.
Of course, two equations having more explanatory power than one is
not, by itself, a test of the dual market hypothesis. For example, two
equations might have significantly more explanatory power than one for a
scatter diagram such as figure 3. However, there is no Identifiable
secondary market. Thus, in addition to requiring two equations to have
significantly more explanatory power than one, we also require the best
fitting lines to have characteristics consistent with the dual market
hypothesis. To correspond to the predictions of dual market theory, one
wage equation should be upward sloping in schooling and experience while
the other equation should be flat with respect to human capital variables
and below the other at most points. Since we are dealing with a sample
of adult males we also expect that there will be fewer observations
associated with the low wage line.
Formally, we may fit two wage equations using maximum likelihood
techniques. Since we do not know a priori with which wage equation to
compare an IndivIdual, we estimate a "switching model with unknown
regimes." To do this we must specify two wage equations and a third
equation which predicts sector attachment and estimate all three
equations simultaneously. The likelihood function for this model can be
found In Appendix 1.
Since the single equation model is nested In the switching model we
may test the hypothesis that the two equation model fits significantly9
better than the single equation model by comparing the log—likelihood
values for the two models. We may then examine the coefficients of the
two wage equations to see if they fit the dual market hypothesis.
The existence of two sectors with different wage setting mechanisms
is fundamental to dual market theory, but it is not incompatible with
human capital theory. While neoclassical economics tends to emphasize
the development of models which are continuous and therefore tractable in
calculus, if the technology were sharply discontinuous In the way
suggested by Piore (l980b), no fundamental assumptions of mainstream
economics would be violated. In this case, individuals would choose the
sector of employment which maximized the expected present value of their
lifetime utility.
The second postulate of dual market theory, that primary sector jobs
are rationed, is less compatible with human capital theory. Dual market
theory maintains that individuals cannot necessarily choose the sector
which they prefer——some workers who would prefer to be employed in the
primary sector cannot find jobs there. As a general phenomena this would
be highly incompatible with the standard neoclassical view. However,
rationing as a general phenomena is believed to be restricted to
recession periods (Piore, l980a). During other periods only women and
minorities are likely to experience rationing. Such a contention, If
true, would be no more troublesome than the widely acknowledged
importance of race and sex discrimination in the determination of wages.
To test for the presence of noneconomic barriers to primary sector
employment, we need to postulate a mechanism for allocating workers10
between the sectors tn the absence of rationing. To begin, we assume
that experience in one sector raises wages in that sector more than it
raises wages in the other sector.' We also assume that workers will
behave so as to maximize utility over their lifetime. Utility is assumed
to be increasing with the net present value (NPV) of lifetime income. If
we then assume that people's preferences with respect to the
non—pecuniary aspects of jobs do not change over their lifetime and that
workers are perfectly informed about the characteristics of all jobs, we
can conclude that workers will choose employment in one of the two
sectors at the beginning of their careers and stay in that sector for
their entire working life.2
If the non—pecuniary characteristics of the two sectors were similar
we would expect workers to pick the sector which yields the highest
lifetime income. However, this is unlikely. Dual market theorists are
unanimous in maintaining that the non—pecuniary aspects of secondary
employment are inferior to those obtained in primary employment. On the
other hand, starting wages in the secondary sector may be higher than in
the primary sector and this could be attractive to a worker who plans to
leave and enter the labor force frequently or change jobs often. In
addition, secondary employers may be less concerned with lateness and
absenteeism and the work pace may be slower in secondary jobs. Formally,
we assume that workers will choose primary sector employment if the log
of the NPV of their income stream in the primary employment exceeds the
log of the NPV of secondary employment by more than an amount C, where
Cis the additive inverse of the compensating differential for secondary11
employment. We may write the probability that a worker is employed in
the primary sector as:














where X is a vector of individual characteristics, Y is years of job
experience, W, is the wage received in the primary sector,e
is a
normally distributed error representing unobserved characteristics
affecting the primary sector wage, and B anda are parameters.
The terms W, e, B. anda are similarly defined for the
secondary sector. Approximating the length of the indlviduaUs working
life by infinity, and using (2) and (3), equation (1) becomes











and dIs the discount rate.12
If we asume that C'is equal to a constant plus a normally
distributed error term (i.e., people's preferences with respect to the
non—pecuniary aspects of employment and their discount rates do not vary
with observable characteristics (X), we may test the hypothesis that
people choose their sector of employment to maximize their utility by
estimating an equation to determine sector membership and testing the
hypothesis that the coefficients on the Xs are equal to —
Bcor






It may not be reasonable to assume that preference for the
non—pecuniary aspects of primary or secondary employment are not related
to any observed worker characteristics. If they are related we would
expect at least some of the B3s to be different from zero even If
workers are free to choose the sector they are employed in.In this case
we may be able to find some Xs which should not be related to tastes or
to suggest inequality constraints on the effects of certain
characteristics on tastes. Specific tests of this type are proposed in
Section IV.
An intuitive explanation of this approach uses the example of race.
Suppose that the lines fitting the scatter diagram in figure 2 were the
same for blacks and whites. Suppose further that the distribution of
education was the same for the two groups, but that a higher proportion
of blacks than of whites were scattered around the lower line. Under13
these circumstances, we would conclude that either blacks are less averse
to secondary employment than are whites or that blacks face
discrimination in obtaining primary jobs. Supplementary evidence would
support the latter explanation.
The data used in this study are drawn from the thirteenth wave (1980)
of the Panel Study on Income Dynamics. We limited the sample to men
working more than one thousand hours in the previous year, did not work
in government and for whom data on education and marital status were
available. Estimates were obtained for both the full sample (2812 cases)
and with only members of the Survey Research Center sample (1696 cases).
IV. Results
Table 1 presents the results for both OLS estimation and the dual
market model. Since the results for the samples are similar, we discuss
only the restricted sample here. The OLS results are similar to those
obtained by other researchers. The return to schooling is about 6
percent while the return to experience is about 1 percent. Whites
receive wages about 13 percent higher than nonwhites holding other
factors constant. Workers living in an SMSA earn wages almost 20 percent
higher than equivalent workers outside an SMSA and workers who have never
been married earn considerably less than other workers. All the
coefficients are highly significant at conventional levels.
The second part of Table 1 tells a very different story from the
results of OLS estimation. The primary sector wage equation resembles
the OLS equation, but there are some striking differences. Most notably,14
the white/nonwhite differential falls to zero (although it is measured
very imprecisely). In addition, the effect of living in an SMSA declines
and the returns to schooling and experience increase somewhat.
On the other hand, the secondary sector wage equation contrasts
sharply with the OLS equation. None of the coefficients is statistically
significant at conventional levels. We cannot resect the hypothesis that
the secondary sector wage equation is completely flat. The return to
experience (which is measured quite precisely) is essentially zero.
Further, the secondary sector wage equation is almost everywhere below
the primary sector. For a non—white living in an SMSA who has never been
married and has a sixth grade education, the predicted primary sector
wage is greater than the secondary wage after one years experience. For
all other workers, except those with less education, the predicted
primary sector wage is always higher than the predicted secondary sector
wage.
Since the coefficients of the secondary sector wage equation are
measured imprecisely, it might be presumed that, in fact, there Is only
one labor market. However, using a likelihood ratio test, we can easily
resect the single labor market (OLS) model at any conventional level of
significance.3 Two wage equations fit the data considerably better
than one.
Thus we can reject the single labor market model and cannot reject
the predictions of dual market theory that there are no returns to
education or experience in the secondary sector. As noted above, this
characterization of the market, while not commonly assumed in mainstream15
economics, is not incompatible with it. A more crucial aspect of dual
market theory is the assumption that primary sector jobs are rationed.
Testing this assumption entails testing constraints on the switchng
equation. Using the restricted sample, we were unable to get the
constrained likelihood function to converge. Since a Wald test of the
constraints is not Invariant with respect to the choice of
normalization,4 a likelihood ratio test is preferable.Consequently,
in the following paragraphs, we report the results of likelihood ratio
tests performed on the full sample.
If workers were free to choose between the sectors and tastes for the
non—pecuniary aspects of employment were not related to the location of a
worker's residence, his marital status, education, or race, we would
expect the coefficients of these variables In the switching equation to
equal the difference between the coefficients in the two wage equations.
It is probably not reasonable to expect workers' preferences with
respect to non—pecuniary job attributes to be independent of these
variables. For example, we would not be surprised to find that workers
outside of SMSAs required less of a compensating differential to get them
to take secondary work since they may often be engaged in agricultural
labor we therefore test the hypothesis that B3 in equation (5) equals
zero for school, white and never married. Twice the difference between
the log—likelihoods for the constrained and unconstrained models is
14.92. The one percent critical value for the chi-square with two
degrees of freedom is 9.2l. Here, too, the hypothesis of free choice
is easily rejected.16
Finally, we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on white
and never married in the switching equation are both equal to the
difference between their respective coefficients in the primary and
secondary wage equations (x2 =14.56,critical value for one degree
of freedom =6.63).We are thus left with three potential explanations
for our results. First, high}y educated workers prefer secondary
employment more than less educated workers. This hypothesis seems
unlikely. Intuitively, we would expect more educated workers to be more
averse to the poor working conditions of secondary employment. Kahn
(1983) finds that the demand for occupational safety increases with
education. A second explanation is that blacks are less averse to
secondary jobs than are whites, but this runs counter to evidence that
blacks are more likely to support unions in representation elections
(Farber & Saks, 1980; Dickens, 1983), are less likely to quit a job
(Viscusi, 1979) and have greater demand for occupational safety than
equivalent whites (Kahn, 1983). Primary jobs are more likely to be
unionized, offer more stable employment and better job safety. If we
cannot accept these other two explanations we are forced to conclude that
blacks face noneconomic barriers to employment in the primary sector.
At the present time there is no formal way of establishing which of
these three explanations is correct. However, since the first two
hypotheses appear to be inconsistent with other studies of the demand for
job quality, the most reasonable explanation Is the last; blacks are
discriminated against when seeking primary employment.
If we accept the dual market hypothesis, we may use the model to
determine the composition of the primary and secondary sector.617
According to this model 11.4 percent of working male heads of households
are employed in the secondary sector. This seems large, especially since
we would expect a sample containing teenagers, women, and the unemployed
to have a higher proportion of secondary workers. Table 2 shows the
makeup of the sample and the secondary market. It also shows the percent
of each type of worker in the secondary market. Since many of the
parameters of the switching model are estimated with a great deal of
error, we also estimated a restricted model (parameter estimates In Table
3) where the wage equation in the secondary sector was constrained to be
flat and education and marital status were removed from the switching
equation. (A likelihood ratio test fails to reject the constraints at
the .1 level.)7
Both models show the same pattern evident in the parameters of the
switching equation: workers in SMSAs, married workers, more educated
workers, and whites are less likely to be in the secondary sector.
Finally, we examine how sharply the model distinguishes between
workers in the primary and secondary sectors. Figure 4 shows the
distribution of predicted probabilities of being In the primary market.
The distribution is distinctly bi-modal, with the two modes at 0—10%
probability and 90-100%. There are a large group of workers who are
clearly Identifiable as being in the secondary sector, and a larger group
with a high probability of being primary workers. Thus, It appears that
there is a distinct secondary sector which the model can Identify.18
V. Conclusions
Our results provide strong support for two of the basic tenets of
dual market theory: there are two distinct sectors of the labor market
with different wage setting mechanisms, and there is a queue for primary
sector sobs, We believe that our approach and results represent a
considerable advance over previous research in this area. By allowing
the distribution of wages and worker attributes to determine our
"assignment't of workers to sectors, we avoid the problems of
arbitrariness and sample selection bias which complicated the
interpretation of earlier research. In addition, our approach allows us
to estimate the size and composition of the secondary work force In a
noncircular manner.
Of course, we cannot exclude other interpretations of these results
which postulate different distributions of the error term or some unusual
nonlinear functional form for the wage equation. While we canot deny
these possibilities, we suggest that in the absence of our results, such
a distribution would not be suggested. It was dual market theory which
led to our test, and the results therefore tend to corroborate that
theory.
However, given the strength of the reactions (deifying or executing
the messenger) of some of the individuals with whom we discussed
preliminary results, it is Important to take stock of exactly what it Is
that we have and have not shown.
More (1983) suggests that the strength of opposition to dual market
theory is due, in part, to the use of participant observer techniques19
rather than econometric techniques which are more common in mainstream
economics. We have shown that the dual market hypothesis can be derived
and supported from standard data and statistical techniques. It is,
however, unlikely that standard approaches would have uncovered labor
market duality, a fact which suggests that there is a role for other
methods in mainstream economics.
On the other hand, the fact that we can test dual market theory using
mainstream techniques suggests that the two theories are not as
incompatible as would appear from the antagonisms in the profession. We
have already suggested that neoclassical economics makes few assumptions
regarding the nature of technology. It is relatively straightforward to
develop a model in which a high fixed cost/low variable cost technology
is used in the "stable" demand sector and a low fixed cost/high variable
cost technology is used to accommodate fluctuations in demand. Plore
(1980b) gives a verbal description of such a theory and Applebaum and Lin
(1982) present a formalization.It is a direct consequence of human
capital theory that workers and firms will invest little in firm speclfic
training If the worker is not expected to remain with the firm for very
long. Thus the existence of two markets with distinct wage profiles can
be easily accommodated by mainstream theory.
Similarly, while when first proposed, the view that there is a queue
for primary sector jobs may have appeared to be incompatible with
neoclassical theory, there are an increasing number of imperfect
information models which imply that there can be a queue for jobs. In
particular, Weiss (1980), Stoft (1982), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1982) and20
Bowles (1983) have developed models In which job queues arise in firms in
which there are unobserved skills or effort. Thus there could well be a
queue for primary sector jobs. If there are few skill differences in
secondary sector jobs, there would be no queues for them.
While these models are compatible with queues, we have presented
evidence that rather than allocating jobs randomly, primary sector
employers discriminate against nonwhites. This may appear to be
incompatible with neoclassical economics. However, discrimination is an
anomaly which remains to be explained whether or not one accepts dual
market theory. In fact, these results may help to explain the existence
and persistence of discrimination. According to the point estimates
presented in the last section, more than 40% of white/non—white wage
differences can be explained in the restricted model by the fact that
non—whites are crowded Into the secondary sector while in the
unrestricted model the within sector differential is zero.If the
unobservability of skills or work effort make it optimal for queues for
primary jobs to exist, primary employers with a utasteil for
discrimination may Indulge It by hiring fewer non—whites from the queue
without sacrificing profits. No economic Incentive exists for the
elimination of this sort of discrimination. Thus the aspects of dual
market theory which we have tested do not appear to us to be incompatible
with mainstream economics.
On the other hand, we do not wish to imply that there are no
incompatibilities between dual market theory and neoclassical economics.
For example, dual market theorists have generally assumed that21
preferences are endogenous, a position strongly resisted by most
mainstream economists despite some exceptions.
Perhaps more Important, dual market theorists have developed very
elaborate theories of the origin and operation of labor market
institutions which are rich in institutional detail.8 These
descriptions are quite remote in many ways from the neoclassical
description of the labor market. However, we have not attempted to test
these aspects of dual market theory.9
Finally, we call the reader's attention to the title of this paper.
We have chosen to refer to our work as a test of dual market theory
rather than as a test of human capital theory because, in our view, dual
market theory is not necessarily incompatible with standard neoclassical
analysis. Our results therefore point to the need for additional work to
understand the origins of these institutions rather than to abandon the
neoclassical model of the labor market. In addition, our results point
to the value of noneconometric techniques for uncovering and
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Composition of Sample and Secondary Sector
23
Total * * 11.4 *
66.9
33.1
% of Sample %ofSecondary%ofworkers in % of % in
Sector workersSecondary SectorSecondarySecondary
















































Estimates for Restricted Model
Variable Primary Secondary Switching
Constant .887 1.22 .503
(.073) (.093) (.281)
SMSA 108 - .537
(.026) (.132)
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Standarderrors in parentheses
Dependent variable: log of hourly wage
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1This assumptionappears reasonable In light of recent empirical
evidence on experience—earnings profiles. James Brown (1983) shows that
experience in other firms counts very little towards earnings for workers
on their current sobs. The assumption entails the existence of sector
specific training. If some training is firm specific it Is ipso facto
sector specific.
21t might be argued thatyoung people, in particular, lack the
necessary career information to make informed ob choices, They may also
have different preferences. For our purposes, these problems should be
of less importance since we estimate our model on a sample of heads of
households.
3Twlce the difference between the log—likelihood values for the
two models is 177. Although the single equation model is nested in the
switching model, when the switching equation model is constrained to
yield the single equation model, several parameters are unidentified.
This problem complicates the calculation of the degrees of freedom. In
addition, it is possible that the asymptotic likelihood ratio statistic
does not have a chi.-squared distribution. However, Monte—Carlo tests
(Goldfeld an Quandt, 1976) suggest that setting the degrees of freedom
equal to the number of constraints plus the number of unidentified
parameters yields a conservative test using the cM—squared
distribution. For our problem, this computation yields fourteen degrees
of freedom. The one percent critical value for the cM-squared29
distribution with fourteen degrees of freedom is 29.14—-far smaller than
our computed likelihood ratio test statistic.
41n the unrestricted model it is notpossible to simultaneously
identify all the coefficients of the switching equation and its error
variance. This is a problem comon to all discrete dependent variable
estimation. Thus any one restriction onthe coefficients of the
switching equation cannot be tested as it would only constitute a
normalization. It Is possible to perform a Wald test if there is more
than one constraint but the test is not invariant to the normalization
chosen. In all cases reported below the results of the Wald test were
Inconclusive since the Wald test rejected the null hypothesis for some
reasonable normalizations but not for others.
5We are imposing three constraints butwe also relax the
normalization that the variance of the switching equation equals one.
Thus there are only two degrees of freedom.
straightforward application of Bayes theorem gives the result
that the probability of being in the primary sector conditional on the
observed wage and personal characteristics is the likelihood given the
individual is in the primary sector divided by the entire likelihood for
that observation.
7Again we note that the measured returns to schooling and
education in the primary sector are larger than in the OLS equation.
Also, the discrimination coefficient is roughly 40% smaller.




Estimation of the Switching Model with Unknown Regimes
Consider the system composed of wage equations for each sector and an










whre W1 is the individuaPs wages, X1 and are vectors of
explanatory variables, and r are vectors of
parameters, . and are normally distributed error
terms and y is a latent variable measuring tendency to be in the
primary sector. (Al) is the wage equation if the individual Is in the
primary sector; (A2) is the wage equation if the individual is in the
secondary sector and (A3) is the switching equation.
We do not observe y. However, If y* > 0, the Individual's wage
is determined by (Al); otherwise it is determined by (A2). Equivalently,
the Individual works in the primary sector If and only if
C3j> —Z1r (A4)31
The likelihood function for the problem is therefore given by:
Pr(c31 > Z1rIZ,X1,c11).f(c11) (A5)
+Pr(c3i< ZiFIZj,Xi,c2i).f(c2j)
The log—likelihood is thus:
013 -Zr-—c N aii









where 4(.) and (.)arethe normal density and cumulative
distribution, respectively and0k
is the covariance of
andCki; 033 is normalized to equal one. Maximum likelihood
estimates for r, 2 and the a'S can be obtained using
standard search algorithms provided that care is taken to prevent the
program from iterating into regions for which the likelihood function is
unbounded.
It is easy to see that if equals I2 and 013
equals 023, then cli equals c21 and the likelihood32
function reduces to the standard normal density. It is therefore
possible to test for the existence of two regimes by comparing the
log—likelihood values for OLS and unknown regime estimates by performing
a likelihood ratio test.
The likelihood functions used here were maximized using the Berndt,
Hall, Hall and Hausman (1974) algorithm. While the nonlinearty of the
mrI nurrtnr diffiriilfdid nM vnrinr. nu riiffirii1fic ' ..
withunboundedness. All unconstrained specifications converged to
interior solutions from OLS starting values.33
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